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Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are systems composed by a physical component that is 
controlled or monitored by a cyber-component, a computer-based algorithm. Advances in 
CPS technologies and science are enabling capability, adaptability, scalability, resiliency, 
safety, security, and usability that will far exceed the simple embedded systems of today. 
CPS technologies are transforming the way people interact with engineered systems. New 
smart CPS are driving innovation in various sectors such as agriculture, energy, 
transportation, healthcare, and manufacturing. They are leading the 4-th Industrial 
Revolution (Industry 4.0) that is having benefits thanks to the high flexibility of production. 
The Industry 4.0 production paradigm is characterized by high intercommunicating 
properties of its production elements in all the manufacturing processes. This is the reason 
it is a core concept how the systems should be structurally optimized to have the adequate 
level of redundancy to be satisfactorily resilient. This goal can benefit from formal methods 
well known in various scientific domains such as artificial intelligence. So, the current 
research concerns the proposal of a CPS meta-model and its instantiation. In this way it 
lists all kind of relationships that may occur between the CPSs themselves and between 
their (cyber- and physical-) components. Using the CPS meta-model formalization, with 
an adaptation of the Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) formal approach, this paper presents 
a way to optimize the modelling of CPS systems emphasizing their redundancy and their 
resiliency. 
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1. Introduction 
The term cyber-physical systems (CPS) refers to a generation of systems with integrated 
computational and physical capabilities. Those systems can interact with other systems 
through many modalities. The interconnected systems create a large range of network that 
are multi-disciplinary and physically-aware engineered systems, adapted from (Gunes et 
al., 2014). Inside this kind of network there are components with advanced abilities: 
sensing, data collection, data transmission and mechanical actuation. 
In cyber-physical systems, physical and software components are deeply entangled. The 
components operate on different spatial and temporal scales interacting with each other 
in multiple ways that are context related. Opportunities and research challenges include 
the design and development of next-generation airplanes and space vehicles, hybrid gas-
electric vehicles, fully autonomous urban driving, and prostheses that allow brain signals 
to control physical objects. 
The CPS concept is strongly related to the 4-th Industrial Revolution (Industry 
4.0). This new industrial conception will have benefits from high flexibility of production, 
easy and more accessible contribution from all involved entities of business processes 
(Zuehlke, 2010). The strategic imperatives in this regard reiterated vendors to embed 
enhanced functionality into the core of enterprise systems to support industry strategy in 
pursuit of the smart factory for responsive, agile, holonic, and resilient manufacturing. 
Those functionalities could harness and manage changes and evolutions. Personal 
interviews with industry experts clearly demanded for strategic alliances with the 
technology vendors to ensure incremental enhancement in the functions in pursuit of a 
smart factory to ultimately earn manufacturing excellence and resilience (Asif et al., 
2018).  
Each component in both physical facilities and cyber devices needs an appropriate 
level of security guard. A scalable and distributed coordination layer is very important to 
ensure its resiliency. In Industry 4.0, the CPS potentially involve trillions of devices, and 
the communication among devices must be highly scalable. The research in this domain 
proposed several methods to find meaningful information from a large amount of noisy 
data by conducting trustworthiness linkage inference on a constructed object-alarm graph 
(Li et al., 2018). To accelerate the assessment of this new conception, the following 
research directions related to the CPS play a key role: optimization of sensor networks 
organization, structural aspects for redundancy optimization, resiliency structures. Those 
fields can benefit from the artificial intelligence research domain. The actual investigation 
is about the application of an approach named Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) for 
modelling and analysing a large-scale set of collaborative systems (Lezoche et al., 2012), 
specifically CPSs. 
The research addressed in this paper is related to the study of FCA-based patterns 
for optimizing CPSs structure related to the properties of redundancy and resiliency.  
In the process of CPS software development (Yiping et al., 2016) stated that one 
should focus on events more than on functions or objects. In our research we focus on 
core function determination from system knowledge. Before addressing this topic, we are 
presenting our definition of what a CPS is, though a meta-model showing all kind of 
relationships that may occur between CPSs themselves and between their (cyber- and 
physical-) components.  
2. A Meta-Model of Cyber-Physical Systems 
Components of a CPS: lets denote as Pi and Ci respectively the set of physical and cyber 
components of a system CPSj. CPSj is a structural agglomerate of these elements Pi and 
Ci which can also include other subsystems CPSk into a composite cyber-physical 
system. There are two relations of different nature between these components: 
• R" - the relation between subsystems to be physically connected (e.g. in a 
production line) and signifies transmission of any kind of physical object 
between systems. 
• R# - the relation of the connection between cyber components which signifies 
the presence of an information/control channel between the components. 
The components of a system perform certain functions depending on their role in 
the system, and according to that they have inputs Ii and outputs Oi, that capture the flows 
between this element and the elements that are related to by R" and R#. As an example, 
for a sensor, inputs and output reflects the transformation of mechanical or physical 
alterations of the physical world into a signal that quantitatively measures a particular 
property. The source and destination of the exchange can be either other components of 
the system or the environment or some external sources or sinks. To cover the latter case, 
we introduce into the sets of all physical and all cyber elements of CPSs, a model 
composed of two elements e" and e# standing respectively for these environmental or 
external sources or destinations. 
We define a system of CPSs as a tuple CPSs = 〈𝒫, 𝒞, 𝒞𝒫𝒮, R", R#〉, where	𝒫 =e" ∪ ⋃ P00  is a set of physical components of individual CPS, 𝒞 = e# ∪ ⋃ C00  is a set of 
cyber components, and 𝒞𝒫𝒮 which is set of CPSs. Each individual CPS of the set 𝒞𝒫𝒮, 
as it was defined before, is a tuple of subset of cyber components, physical components 
and other CPS that it consolidates. Here we assume that every element of 𝒫, 𝒞, and	𝒞𝒫𝒮 
has its corresponding inputs Ii and outputs Oi. The details of exchange do not have special 
interest for our research in this paper, in general Ii and Oi can be of any type and have any 
values or contents. 
Compositionally, different CPSs c6, c7 ∈ 	𝒞𝒫𝒮 could share some of their 
components: c6 ∩ c7 ≠ ∅. For example, as in systems utilizing the same computational 
node to supervise physical production activities, or as an actuator such as a light switch 
which can be considered as a part of two systems: one is the local electrical circuit of an 
apartment, and the other is a smart-home system for automating and controlling the 
household electronics. Figure 1 is an example of two simple CPSs consisting of one 
physical (Pi) and one cyber (Ci) component each forming a composite CPS. The 
communication between CPS1 and CPS2 is done through the relations between C1 and C2; 
and the composite CPS3 has its own actuator components P3 and C3. 
 
Figure 1, Composite CPS3 consisting of two subordinate systems CPS1 and CPS2 
and providing its proper functionality through components P3 and C3. 
2.1 CPS Meta model 
The proposed meta-model CPSs = 〈𝒫, 𝒞, 𝒞𝒫𝒮, R", R#〉 that we have elaborated is 
presented in UML 2.0 notation on  
Figure 2. In the scientific literature, some authors have proposed different results related 
to CPS meta models from different points of view. (Jeon at al., 2012) present the CPS 
Meta Modeller tool for designing complex and large-scale systems using the Electronics 
and Telecommunication Research Institute (ETRI1) CPS Modelling Language. 
(Mezhuyev et al., 2013) show the geometrical meta-metamodel, allowing to link the 
                                               
1 https://www.etri.re.kr/eng/main/main.etri 
physical properties of domains with its spatial structure. Some other authors (Son et al., 
2012) show how to transform a Simulink model into an ETRI CPS Modeling Language 
(ECML) model for modelling CPS for simulating its behaviour and (Klimeš, 2014) shows 
how to control cyber-physical systems deriving behavioural specifications from user 
inputs. All these researches focused on the design and the internal behaviour of a CPS. 
Our work presents a formal meta-model of the structure of any CPS, for proposing a 
common formal foundation of a composite CPS, aggregating the broad definitions found 
in the literature.  
The elaborated meta model finds its focus in the interaction of the cyber 
component, which naturally stands for its computational functionality, and the physical 
component, which models its physical behaviour. The existence of those two entities let 
emerge the concept of Cyber-Physical System. If one of those components doesn’t exist 
there is no possibility to have a CPS. The Physical component is modelled as an abstract 
class, it could be composed by a sensing component, an actuating component or by a 
component that merges the two capabilities. A CPS component needs an input and an 
output. It cannot exist a CPS component that has got only one of those two properties. An 
atomic CPS is the one that does not have any subsystems, but his own functional 
elements. This definition is created to show, with the best detail possible, the relationships 
between the two different parts of the entire CPS system. It stops at the presented 
“atomic” level because of the scope of this scientific paper that focuses on the 
relationships of the CPSs and the possibility to improve their interoperability.  
We also note that we do not make difference between physical and cyber types of 
communication and corresponding types of input and output interfaces, although it could 
be a worthwhile extension for a future model. 
The relation ‘is part of’ (physically) is introduced into the model to represent 
physical structure of systems and their inclusion into one another on the physical level. 
As an extension to this type of composition of complex CPS we also introduce the 
aggregation relation ‘logically includes’. Together with inheritance relation between 
classes Composite CPS and Atomic CPS it complies to the structural Composite pattern. 
With help of this aggregation relation, we model the property of CPS of dynamical 
reconfiguration and adaptation. Any system can lend its functionality to many super-
systems (we borrow the utilisation of sub- and super- prefixes from mathematics, by 
analogy with subsets and supersets), although probably not at the same time. Inversely, 
any system can accommodate multiple subsystems. 
 
Figure 2 Meta-model of CPS 
The class of Cyber-Physical Production Systems can be viewed, in the proposed meta-
model, as a subclass of Composite CPS. This interpretation goes in the same direction of 
the Monostori definition (Monostor, 2014). There is a tight connection between these two 
relations ‘is physically part of’ and ‘logically includes’, in the sense that whenever a 
system is in the relation ‘is physically part of’ this also entails that it is being ‘logically 
included’ in that system, but not in the other direction.  
3. Finding Resiliency structure in CPS sub-systems 
In the literature, we can find several definitions of the term “resilience”. In (Sterbenz et 
al., 2010) the resilience is the ability to provide and maintain an acceptable level of service 
in the face of faults and challenges to normal operation. Another definition in (Hollnagel, 
2006) positions the resilience as the “ability of a system or organization to react to and 
recover from disturbances at an early stage with minimal effect on its dynamic stability.” 
There are different ranges of threats and challenges for services that can vary from the 
simple misconfiguration over large scale natural disasters (Smith, 2011). In order to 
increase the resilience of a given system, the possible defies and risks need to be 
recognised and the proper metrics must be defined to protect the endangered service.  
Unlike the traditional resiliency method, in which a function is allocated to each 
abstract component, a CPS is modelled in our work as a set of sub-systems. Each one is 
represented by a subset of components. 
3.1 Related works 
The redundancy is the duplication of critical components or functions of a system, 
it is the ability of providers to have different alternatives. A resilient system must have 
duplicate components (physical redundancy) or otherwise more than one configuration 
for working systems’ components (functional redundancy). The higher the degree of 
redundancy, the more resilient the system would be (Azadeh et al., 2018). 
Initially the intention of redundancy is the increasing reliability of the system but 
it can also present itself as modelling errors. Various methodologies exist in literature to 
face the redundancy optimization problems. (Aggarwal et al., 1975) state to select the 
stage where redundancy is to be added, an heuristic criterion is introduced which takes 
into account the relative increment in reliability versus decrement in performance. 
(Dokhanchi at al., 2018) propose a framework for the elicitation and debugging of formal 
specifications for Cyber-Physical Systems through two debugging algorithms. One 
checks for erroneous or incomplete temporal logic specifications without considering the 
system and the other can be used for the analysis of reactive requirements with respect to 
system test traces. The user study establishes that requirement errors are common and 
that the debugging framework can resolve many insidious specification modellers'  errors. 
The redundancy study is also a way to prevent a single-point of failure, as stated by 
(Cardenas et al., 2008) or hardware failure that is not considered in design (Wan et al., 
2011) thus, practical systems may need to incorporate redundancy. The knowledge of the 
domain and application context may help to unify information presentation and permits 
subsystems reuse, so as to reduce information redundancy during the process of semantic 
interpretation in the agents. (Lin et al., 2010) define an ontology for the system domain 
to reduce information redundancy in the model and simplify the data interpretation 
procedure. The redundancy problem has been studied under multiple points of views, our 
approach focuses the structural evidence coming from the formal knowledge extracted by 
the data clustering. It has become increasingly crucial that cognitive representations of 
the models need to be created as a pre-requisite for assessing and intelligently managing 
the complexity, maneuvering through uncertain environments and eventually achieving 
the optimized outcomes (Chung-Sheng et al., 2018). 
Resilience is not only related with decreasing the probability of failure. It also 
highlights the need to recuperate from unexpected instabilities in the operating 
environment (Tierney and Bruneau, 2007). Fundamentally, resilience indicates the ability 
of a system to recover, it is a function of various system properties, including component 
reliability and architecture re-configurability. Resilience can be divided into two 
categories (Rose, 2007):  
(1) the “static resilience” is related to the “ability of an entity or a system to 
maintain function,” or to survive, when disrupted;  
(2) the “dynamic resilience” deals with recovery of the system after a shock.  
Resilience is highly context dependent — it depends on the architecture of the system, its 
operational environment, and the disruptive event. For example: 
• Different systems are resilient to different disruptions.  
• A system could be resilient to one type of disruption but not to another type.  
The resilience approaches can also be comprehended through the application ways. 
Mostly, this refers to using the frameworks for three different purposes, diagnostic, 
evaluative and planning: 
• Diagnostic – evaluating the degree to which a system is resilient to diverse shocks 
for measuring and quantifying resilience. 
• Evaluative – determining the level to which resilience activity is successful in 
achieving its objective. 
• Planning – formulating the consequences of the resilience approach to understand 
how the planned design fits into the intervention procedure. (Constas et al., 2014).  
The Resilience in Industry 4.0 reiterates optimal manufacturing to reap the dream of 
productivity and manufacturing excellence. Whilst all indications are that ERP system 
integrates all business processes, yet, the existing enterprise systems lack sophistication 
for data integration in relation to the manufacturing functionality for online planning and 
Control (OnP/OnC). Hence, there is a need of holistic research in this domain to optimise 
the core capabilities of industry (company)-specific production. The implications of 
enterprise system implementation in the industry 4.0, may act as a precursor for future 
researchers to contemplate the interaction through whole the product life cycle. As an 
outcome of the research, the exploration of the role of the big data, the analytics and the 
cyber-physical systems in achieving the resilience objectives of a smart and connected 
cyber-physical factory would be a core research topic (Asif et al., 2018). 
Most resilience-related research uses some aspect of network theory to study effects of 
disruptions (Crucitti et al., 2005). Due to the analysis of many systems, it is not possible 
to assume homogenous nodes. The frameworks that make this assumption are not able to 
analyse those types of networks. A few studies have considered nodes with the same 
function but different capacities (Crucitti et al., 2005) and managed to create a roadmap 
of enabling technologies of CPS in three types of network. Those networks are 
constructed to manage the resources such as computation power, storage, and bandwidth, 
and enable resilient services selection. (Chun Kit et al., 2018). 
Lately, multilayer networks resilience is acquiring attention as a way to characterise 
heterogeneous networks. Networks can be modelled as multilayers in two different ways. 
The network may consist of different physical layers or it may require support from 
different layers. The results of the studies in this field have stated the concept of 
interdependent network analyses to highlight the characteristics of such networks 
(Rinaldi, 2004). Applying these studies to CPSs, designers can study how a failure in one 
network can have repercussions in the other and how interdependent networks can fail 
catastrophically after the removal of a small fraction of nodes. These results in turn can 
guide resource allocation at critical nodes.  
Recent research has tried to influence control theory to handle with resilience of 
interconnected and interdependent systems (Liu, Slotine, and Barabasi 2011) with the 
ultimate goal of developing resilient controllers (Alessandri and Filippini, 2013). 
All the studied frameworks lack the rigorous and formal approach to analyse the 
structural features. Our proposal focuses on the formal structuration of key features that 
add more resilience to the studied system. 
3.2 Definitions 
In this work, we use the following definitions: 
Definition 1 (function): a function F is a candidate for an abstract component. F 
is formed by the tuple <I, O>, where I is the set of inputs I = {I1, I2, ... In}, and O is the 
set of outputs O = {O1, O2, ... Om}. 
Definition 2 (CPS subsystem function): A CPS subsystem function ssf Î F is an 
oriented graph Gssf = (Fssf, Essf) which corresponds to a part of a CPS. Fssf = {Fssf,1, Fssf,2, 
..., Fssf,n} is the set of functions belonging to the sub-system ssf, and E is the set of 
dependency relations that connect these functions, where <Fssf,i, Fssf,j> = <Fssf,i.O → 
Fssf,j.I> denotes the connection between functions Fssf,i and Fssf,j within the subsystem ssf. 
Definition 3 (function request): a function query Q is a directed graph Gq = (F, 
E), where S = {S1, S2, ..., Sn} is the set of nodes and each node corresponds to a function 
requested by a user. E is the set of arcs corresponding to the dependency relations between 
these requested services. 
Definition 4 (composite function): a composite function CF is a directed graph 
Gf = (SSF, E), where SSF is a set of CPS subsystem functions, and E is the set of 
dependency relations between them. A dependency relation <ssfi, ssfj> = <ssfi.O →ssfj.I> 
denotes the connection between subsystem functions ssfi and ssfj within the candidate 
composition CF. A composite function CF satisfies a query Q if, and only if, Gf = (SSF, 
E) and Gq = (S, E) are isomorphic. 
4. Applying a formal method to structure knowledge model 
Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) is a mathematical theory invented by Rudolf Wille in 
(Wille, 1982). The theory is a bridge between mathematics, data analysis and ordered set 
theory. This method allows grouping objects according to their common properties 
(Kumar and Singh, 2014). Two key FCA structures are exploited in the present work, 
namely formal context and Galois lattice. A formal context is the triplet (O, A, R), where 
O is a set of objects, A is a set of attributes and R = O×A is the set of binary relations 
between O and A. Assuming that an object o has the attribute a, the relation R between o 
and a is denoted by oRa. A formal context can be represented by a matrix (O×A), where 
the lines and columns respectively correspond to the objects and attributes, and the entries 
denote the relationships between them, that is, Rij = 1 if the object Oi contains the attribute 
Aj. Otherwise, Rij = 0. Table 2 shows an example of formal context K = (O, A, R), where 
O is a set of objects O = {O1, O2, O3, O4, O5, O6, O7, O8}, A is a set of attributes A = {A1, 
A2, A3, A4, A5}, and R is a set of binary relationships between O and A. 
 
Table 1 - Example of a formal context 
From the above formal context, a set of clusters called “formal concepts” are 
derived to form a complete lattice structure. A lattice of formal concepts can be 
represented in the form of an ordered diagram, also called a Hasse diagram. Each node 
of this diagram corresponds to a cluster and the arcs represent the relations of inclusion 
between the concepts. Each formal concept has two sections. The Extent section regroups 
a sub-set of objects sharing the common attributes, whereas the Intent section contains 
those attributes shared by objects in the Extent part. The figure 3 shows an example of 
concept lattice corresponding to the formal context in Table 1 
 
 
Figure 3 - example of concept lattice 
Formal Concept Analysis has been successfully applied in several domains, such as 
knowledge discovery, road networks modelling, information retrieval, ontology merging, 
software code analysis, etc. (Poelmans et al., 2013). We propose a method that describes 
a new way of finding reliable functions by reusing CPS subsystems. To allow the 
extraction of relevant CPS subsystems, we start in the next section by modelling and 
clustering the CPS subsystems according to their component functions. 
5. Modelling CPS sub-systems functions 
The explicit definition of CPS substitutable functions (CSF), as well as their component 
functions and the relationships between them, is the first step toward effective 
composition of CPS function subsystem. In this section, we model such CSF information 
in the form of a formal context. 
Consider the CSF formal context Kf = (SSF, F, R), where F is the set CPS 
subsystems functions SSF = {SSF1, SSF2, SSF3, ..., SSFn}, F is the set of functions F = 
{F1, F2, F3, ..., Fn} and R is the set of binary relations between fragments and services. 
 
Table 2 shows an example of CSF formal context with eight subsystem functions and six 
functions that form the user request. 
 Table 2 - Formal context KF of subsystem functions 
As shown in the formal context above, the entries indicate whether a fragment 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹 
contains a service s ∈ S (value 1) or s ∉ S (value 0). From the formal context KF, a set of 
clusters called formal concepts are derived to construct a complete lattice LF of fragments 
(see Figure 2). In the literature, there are several lattice construction algorithms such as 
Bordat, Godin, Dowling (Poelmans et al., 2010). We use the Bordat algorithm (Bordat, 
1986) to construct the lattice of fragments. This algorithm is very successful when it runs 
on contexts of low density. The lattice of fragments is illustrated in Figure 4 and 
represents the hierarchy of concepts that group the fragments according to their common 
component services. 
 Figure 4 - Lattice LF of process fragments 
The top formal concept in the above lattice is called Supremum, whereas the 
bottom is called Infimum. From Table 3, we can deduct, from the empty Extent column 
in the formal concept C15, that there is no CPS subsystem offering all the functions {F1, 
F2, F3, F4, F5, F6} requested by the user.  
 Table 3 - Formal concepts of the context KF 
The concept C8 shows, through its Extent column, the existence of a CPS 
subsystem {SSF8} which offers the functions {F2, F4, F6}. The concept C3 shows that 
there exist two subsystems {SSF3, SSF6}, which offer two of the requested functions {F3, 
F4}. Assume that a user sends a request containing the functions {F1, F2, F3, F5}. By 
running through the above lattice, we can satisfy this request using several combinations 
of subsystems: 
- Combination 1: C7.Extent ∪ C4.Extent 
- Combination 2: C1.Extent ∪ C2.Extent ∪ C4.Extent 
- Combination 3: C1.Extent ∪ C3.Extent ∪ C4.Extent 
Note that the conjunction of several Extent parts may lead to one or more CSF 
combinations. As an example, the Extent part of the formal concept C1 contains two 
candidate subsystems (SSF1 and SSF7) that offer two of the five requested functions (F1 
and F2), whereas C7.Extent contains only one candidate subsystem (SSF7) that offers three 
functions (F1, F2 and F3). To satisfy the user’s request, some CSF combinations can be 
extracted from the formal concepts C1, C2 and C4, which are {SSF1, SSF7}, {SSF2, SSF6} 
and {SSF4, SSF5}. These CSF combinations are determined by analysing the hidden 
relations between formal concepts and checking if the function in their Intent parts may 
satisfy the user needs. 
In this way, analysing the formal context through a standard research algorithm, it is easy 
to highlight the weakness of a system finding the lack of redundancy and explicitly the 
absence of resiliency. The lack of redundancy, as stated also in (Zheng et al, 2017), could 
expose the whole system to a vulnerability in the systems security domain. The presented 
method is used to find the absence of redundancy and not to list a gradient of the 
redundancy level. 
5.1 Hierarchical structures of the meta-model and the corresponding algebraic 
lattice representation through a simple case study 
Unlike our previous approach (Morozov et al, 2017) where we modelled CPS using 
Formal Concept Analysis in a standard object-attribute fashion, currently we extend the 
modelling approach to also take into account links that exist between components and 
also for hierarchical inclusion of systems one into another according to their composite 
structure. 
In this way, CPSs can be modelled independently in the physical and cyber 
perspectives using corresponding relations, each one defining an algebraic lattice. The 
hierarchical structure gives rise to the third lattice that can be used for tacit knowledge 
recognition and further explicitation. 
Given the CPS model in Figure 4, we can list the functions offered by each element of 
the atomic CPS subsystems. The functionalities offered by the atomic Physical parts of 
this CPS are resumed in the following 
 
Table 4. 
 
Table 4 – Functions offered by Physical part of the CPS atomic subsystems 
On the other part the functionalities offered by the atomic Cyber parts of this 
CPS are resumed in the following 
 
Table 5. 
 
Table 5 – Functions offered by Cyber part of the CPS atomic subsystems 
At this stage, we will not focus on the Inputs and Outputs of the elementary 
functions taking in account that, for simplicity, they are the same for the equal function 
and there is not a partial overlapping of the domains and ranges. Given this information 
about the CPS functionality we will describe and formalise manually the experts’ 
knowledge that will be a key point to let the model and the formal tool to work properly. 
 Figure 5 CPS Functional Model example. 
In the following 
 
Table 6, we will present what are the same functions offered by the Physical 
elements and the Cyber elements of the same CPS of Figure 5. We will also name the 
function to be ready to be used in the formal context creation. 
 Table 6 – Equal functions offered by Cyber and Physical part of the CPS 
In our analysis, we will include also the implicit “part of” property of the atomic 
subsystems towards the complete one. The following Table 7 presents the three functions 
representing that knowledge. 
 
Table 7 – Equal functions offered by Cyber and Physical part of the CPS 
Taken in account all that information, we can create the formal context for the CPS of 
Figure 5. 
 Table 8 – Formal context of Figure 5 CPS 
From this formal context, we are able to automatically produce the following formal 
concepts, summarised in the Table 9. 
 Table 9 – Formal concepts of Figure 5 CPS 
Analysing the formal context in 
 
Table 8 and the formal concepts in 
 
Table 9, we can easily produce lattices representing various information of the studied 
CPS and following the CPS Meta-model presented in  
Figure 2.  
The lattices in Figure 6 represents the Cyber part (6a) and the Physical part (6b) of the 
CPS presented in Figure 5. 
 Figure 6 – 6a: Cyber part of CPS – 6b: Physical part of CPS 
The lattice in Fig 7 represents the CPS in its completeness highlighting the “part of” 
relations through the inclusive functions 𝐹?6, 𝐹?7, 𝐹?@. 
 
Figure 7 – Lattice representation of CPS depicted on Figure 5 
As we can simply deduce, from the 
 
Table 9, the Figure 6 and the Figure 7 lattices, that the analysed CPS is not fully resilient. 
In fact, there are three functions that are nowhere duplicated. If the following functions 𝐹@A, 𝐹BC  and 𝐹DC  would stop working no other CPS subsystem could replace them. Using 
the Figure 6 representation we can rapidly identify the CPS redundancy focusing on the 
node labels. The node that includes more than one CPS subsystems shows the existence 
of the redundancy subsystem in the entire system. As an example, in the Figure 6a we 
find the CPS2 and CPS6 duplicating the same cyber functions and in the Figure 6b we find 
the CPS4 and CPS6 duplicating the same physical functions. 
5.2 A simple real case study to present the proposed process 
In this section we schematize an enterprise with four production lines and we will show 
the process to perform a redundancy and a resiliency analysis.  
The Figure 8 presents the schema of the shop floor where the four manufacturing lines 
are controlled by two cameras that send the data flow towards a malfunctions detection 
software. Each production line is composed by a machine, that performs a particular 
manufacturing function FRx, linked to some intelligent sensors measuring some physical 
dimensions. The following definitions explain the various functions:  
• FWx represent the water sensors monitoring if there is unattended humidity in parts 
of the production line where it should not be. 
• FPx represent the pressure sensors monitoring a level of pressure not tolerable by the 
manufacturing machines. 
• FTx represent the temperature sensors monitoring the environmental temperature. 
• FCx represent the camera controlling the four manufacturing lines. The data flow is 
sent to a software to detect potential malfunctions. 
In Table 10 are presented the functions offered by the system. This table represents the 
experts knowledge related to the presented system. 
Equal Function offered 
FC = FC1 = FC2 
FRa = FR1 = FR4 
FRb = FR2 = FR3 
FT = FT1 = FT2 
Table 10 – Equal functions offered by the CPSx 
 Figure 8 – Four production lines controlled by two cameras 
Taken in account all the information from the Table 10 and the Figure 8, we can create 
the Table 11 in which there will be the formal context for the entire production system.  
Functions 
Subsystems 
FC FRa FRb FW1 FW2 FP1 FP2 FT 
CPS1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CPS2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CPS3 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
CPS4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
CPS5 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
CPS6 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Table 11 in which there will be the formal context for the entire production system 
From this formal context, we are able to automatically produce the following formal 
concepts, summarised in the Table 12. 
 
 
Formal Concepts 
Concept Name < {Concept Extent}, {Concept Intent} > 
1 < {CPS1, CPS2}, {FC}> 
2 < {CPS3}, {FRa, FW1, FP1} > 
3 < {CPS4, CPS5}, {FRb, FT} > 
4 < {CPS5}, {FRb, FW2, FT} > 
5 < {CPS6}, {FRa, FP2} > 
6 < {CPS3, CPS6}, {FRa} > 
7 < {CPS1, CPS2, CPS3, CPS4, CPS5, CPS6}, {} > 
8 < {}, {FC, FRa, FRb, FW1, FW2, FP1, FP2, FT} > 
Table 12 Formal concepts derived from the Formal context presented in Table 11. 
Given the Formal concepts it is immediate, through a simple research algorithm, finding 
particular configurations of the intents, the offered functions, that are related to the 
extents, the subsystems composed by the CPSs. 
For examples the controller function, FC, is assured only by the CPS1 and CPS2. 
CPS3 and CPS6 have the common manufacturing function FRa but they differ in 
relation to the other sensors, so a possible logical derivation could be to extend the 
specific sensors to one another. 
The formal concept number 7 gives the information that there is no function offered by 
all the subsystems.  
The formal concept number 8, in a complementary way, states that there is no 
subsystem that offers all the functionalities. 
5.3 Assisting the Cyber-Physical Systems Modelling Process 
Following the various proposals in literature (Khaitan, 2015), we describe the generalized 
CPS model as a system of components. Those components can be unmistakeably divided 
onto two disjoint groups:  
1. a control decision and a sensor part, that represents the system cyber layer,  
2. a physical counter-part, i.e. all actuators that bridge the information into real-
world actions. 
This explicit separation between the two system abstracts parts imposes a limitation on 
the modelling approach. However, its application does not lead to any restrictions on how 
the system will be later specified or implemented. In our modelling approach, we propose 
this two layers’ division as a separation between the system components functional roles. 
We consider the physical nodes as terminal execution nodes which highlight the 
behaviour of the system. In contrast sensor and computation nodes from the cyber layer 
provide data and decisions. The cases where a cyber-node itself realizes tail end functions 
can be inferred from the above case by separating its modelling element into two disjoint 
elements: the physical one which takes over the functions and the cyber one which serves 
for computations.  
Our research investigates the properties of concept lattices, it proposes an illustrative case 
study of its application to CPS. The comprehension of a system is an iterative process, 
spacing from a general view to focus towards specific subsystems. In FCA toolset, which 
is built around a complete lattice, this topic is addressed by arising clusters which covers 
all levels of generalization. The lattice diagram helps in visual navigation and the 
implication outlines the axioms proper to the studied domain. 
Another relevant topic in the CPSs field is related to deal with big scale systems and the 
production of a great quantity of data. The literature on FCA proposes various techniques 
tackling this issue: iceberg concept lattices (Stumme, 2002), projections of pattern 
structures (Ganther, 2001), and feature selection methods. 
6. Conclusion 
Two results are achieved in this scientific work. 
1. The first one is the presentation of a CPS meta model that represents a first step 
towards the knowledge formalisation needed to structure the use of formal tools, 
2. and the second is the FCA adaptation to this domain to find hidden knowledge 
thanks to the implicit relations existing in the structure of the system. 
We analysed and discovered in an automatic and simple way the lack of resilience and 
the presence of redundancy in the analysed CPS looking directly at the CPS model. The 
simple example presented show how to focus the weakness of a system and how-to 
strength its resiliency analysing the Lattice and the formal concepts created from the 
system model. In the same way, we can balance the redundancy of the system lowering 
the number of the repeated functions offered by different subsystems. The system context 
is a key knowledge to optimize the redundancy level. The context expresses reality 
constraints. Formalizing those constraints and integrating them in the FCA formal context 
will improve the accuracy of the model and let understand the hidden links between 
existing concepts. Generally, those links represent the redundant concepts to optimize. 
This analysis is under study to use the appropriated formal way.  
Formal Concept Analysis has been applied in many domains as a knowledge 
representation and discovery tool. The current paper adapts this approach and its 
evaluation for the needs of CPS modelling and analysis. The proposed result highlights 
the FCA bottom-up approach focusing with the particularities of the domain and building 
upon them a structure to allow to discover the general dependencies. Some research 
studying relations between the FCA and the graph modelling methods (Carbonnel et al., 
2016), (Morozov et al., 2017) specifies the need of the use of extra filtering after the 
lattice building process. As a further development of the approach, we plan to study the 
use of the resulting lattice-models to response some of the pressing questions of Industry 
4.0 such as the identification of redundancies in functionalities, the improvement of the 
systems plasticity and their auto-adaptation to environment changes. The future research 
would be to implement an approach of reinforcement learning algorithms in the CPS so 
that, by themselves, following several iterations, the systems could learn the specificities 
of each other and build, autonomously and in a collaborative way, their own global model. 
Another feature to add to the presented approach would be the interpretation of the models 
through some extra knowledge derived from formal representations (e.g. Ontologies). 
This property would improve the automatic modelling and discovery steps. The formal 
knowledge representation would be complementary in relation to the informal (expert 
experiences) source of knowledge. The definition of correspondences between the lattices 
will be used for a much more optimised improvement of systems’ resilience. 
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